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Security Model

Status of this page. This page replaces the previous Security Model. It reflects the findings of the M6 review (ORBIT-VCA-2026-001), which showed that the code and keypad displayed by the VCA pinpad can be reconstructed from captured frames. It describes only what the current release provides. It applies identically to the wallet app and to the SDK.

1. What the VCA pinpad guarantees, and what it does not​

The pinpad provides single-use, transaction-bound approval: each approval challenge is generated for one transaction and is valid only within that transaction's window.

The pinpad does not protect the confidentiality of what it displays. Anything rendered for a human to perceive can be observed by a screen recorder or a camera. Dynamic visual cryptography relies on temporal integration (persistence of vision), and a recorder integrates captured frames the same way. Human readability and machine readability share one mechanism, so neither can be granted without the other.

What dynamic visual cryptography provides is narrow: a single frame shows only a random subset of segments, so one screenshot does not reveal the code. Any capture of several frames, or a camera, recovers the code and the keypad.

2. Adversarial model​

AdversaryIn scopeProtection in the current release
Replay of a recorded approval in another sessionYesMitigated: challenges are single-use and bound to one transaction
Single screenshot of the approval screenYesMitigated: one frame does not reveal the code
On-device malware capturing the screen (MediaProjection, accessibility service, root)YesNot mitigated
On-device malware or AI agent capturing the screen and injecting inputYesNot mitigated: it can complete the approval currently displayed
Overlay or clipper malware that reads the displayed code and recipientYesNot mitigated
External camera with line of sight to the screenYesNot mitigated

MITRE ATT&CK T1410 (Screen Capture) is not mitigated by the pinpad.

3. Security properties​

3.1 Single-use, transaction-bound approval​

Each challenge is valid for one transaction and one window. A recorded interaction has no reuse value, so cross-session replay is prevented.

Limit. This does not protect the transaction currently being approved. An adversary that reads the live challenge can complete that approval. Device binding does not help when the adversary runs on the same device.

3.2 Single-frame illegibility​

Each frame lights a random subset of each digit's segments, so a single captured frame does not reveal the code.

Limit. A per-pixel maximum or mean over a few captured frames reconstructs the code and keypad. This property offers no protection against any adversary able to capture more than one frame.

4. Residual risk​

An adversary holding a screen-capture channel on the device (or a camera with line of sight), together with a way to enter input, can approve the transaction currently displayed without the user. In the current release, the pinpad adds no protection beyond single-use binding for that transaction.

Future designs are outside the scope of this page and will be documented only once shipped.

Appendix A: claims withdrawn (review section 2.1)​

These statements asserted that captured frames carry no usable information. They are removed.

FileWithdrawn statement (summary)
docs/Technoloy/About Deep Tech/Visual Cryptography Auhentication.mdx (line 32)Machines see only meaningless static
docs/Technoloy/About Deep Tech/Visual Cryptography Auhentication.mdx (line 34)A channel only humans can perceive and decode
docs/Technoloy/Deep Technology/Dynamic Visual Cryptograpy.mdx (line 8)Perceptible only to the human eye, meaningless to software or malware
docs/Security/Security Model.mdx (line 40)Only a human eye can reconstruct the content
docs/Security/Security Model.mdx (line 43)Prevents screen-scraping
docs/Technoloy/Key Differantiators/Vs. Oauth-PKCE-Passkey.mdx (line 81)Immune to screen capture or AI scraping
docs/Security/mitre_att_ck.md (line 26)T1410: screen content meaningless unless seen by a human; now marked not mitigated
docs/Technoloy/Deep Technology/Dynamic Visual Cryptograpy.mdx (line 23)Malware must reproduce the display logic frame by frame

Appendix B: claims narrowed or removed (review section 2.2)​

FilePrevious statement (summary)Replacement
Milestone pages, e.g. developers/Milestones/M1/demo-tutorial/local-demo-with-docker.md (line 119) and M2–M4 equivalents, android_app_local_node_launch.md (line 116)Each interaction resistant to malware, phishing and adversarial AIEach approval is single-use and bound to one transaction. The pinpad does not protect against malware or an AI agent able to capture the screen. See Security Model.
developers/SDK/intro.md (line 15)Core anti-injection guaranteeAnti-replay guarantee: each approval is single-use and bound to one transaction. An on-device agent with screen capture and input injection can complete an approval.
docs/Technoloy/Deep Technology/Dynamic Visual Cryptograpy.mdx (line 35)Information-theoretically secure by designRemoved. Replaced by: a single frame shows a random subset of segments; the displayed sequence is not secret against a recorder.
docs/Technoloy/About Deep Tech/Visual Cryptography Auhentication.mdx (line 86)Prevents overlay attacks and clipper malwareRemoved.

Appendix C: claims kept with a limit (review section 2.3)​

FileStatementLimit now stated
docs/Technoloy/Deep Technology/Dynamic Visual Cryptograpy.mdx (lines 21–33)Device-bound, session-specific, no reuse valuePrevents cross-session replay only. Does not protect the transaction currently being approved, and device binding does not help against an adversary on the same device.